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THE UNION-NONUNION WAGE DIFFERENTIAL: 
A REPLICATION AND EXTENSION 
Introduction 
The growth of the nonunion sector of the building construction 
industry was one of the major developments in labor relations during 
the 1970's. Given the growth in residential construction volume during 
that decade, the growth of the nonunion sector was unsurprising. A 
union-nonunion wage ratio greater than unity would lead the marginal 
contractor (the last contractor to enter production) to employ nonunion 
labor, rather than union labor. Further, to the extent that existing 
contractors can become "double breasted," (that is, ope~ate both ' union 
and nonunion operations), existing contractors have an incentive to 
shift their marginal output (the last contract received) from the union 
to the nonunion shop. 
One must ask, then, why union construction wage growth remained 
high during the '70's. ~err (1954) suggested that the construction la-
bor market is sufficiently balkanized that union leaders prefer to set 
their members' wages on some equity basis and to let the disemployed 
members move to the (separate) nonunion sector. Thus, supply adjusts 
to the level of union wages, rather than union wages' adjusting to sup-
ply and demand. 
If Kerr's balkanization hypothesis is an accurate description of 
union wage policy, and if union members do move to the nonunion sector, 
then the supply of nonunion construction labor increases when demand for 
construction activity is low and the nonunion sector is more sensitive 
to the business cycle than it would otherwise be. The result, then, 
would be to lower nonunion wages relative to union wages, inducing more 
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construction activity to move to the nonunion sector. The latter re-
sponse would serve to moderate the wage reduction in the nonunion sec-
tor. Given, then, some marginal rate of technical substitution of non-
union for union labor and a union wage policy predicated on balkaniza-
tion, each set of labor market conditions should generate a unique 
equilibrium union-nonunion wage ratio. 
Stephen Welch (1980) has generated one set of estimates of the de-
terminants of that wage ratio (albeit without asserting its unique 
equilibrium characteristics). Our purpose here is to replicate and ex-
tend Welch's research, thus investigating further the determinants of 
that equilibrium. \'le were able to employ a more extensive data set 
than that available to Welch, thus extending his work to more recent 
years. We also extend Welch's research in that our specification in-
corporates market conditions directly, rather than using dichotomous . 
variables to represent location in individual urban labor markets. 
Like Welch, we specify a cross-sectional model of the union-
nonunion wage ratio. Thus, we assume that the wage policy of construc-
tion craft unions is invariant across locations. Further, we assume 
that the marginal rate of technical substitution of nonunion for union 
labor is invariant in cross section. Several factors serve to make that 
MRTS differ from unity. Union craftsmen may be better trained (given 
the availability of apprenticeship training in the union sector), making 
union craftsmen more productive than their nonunion counterparts. Fur-
ther, union craft work is more clearly standardized than is nonunion 
work. Thus, nonunion carpenters may perform laborer's work as well as 
carpentry. Thus, some of the difference in wages may be due to 
\ 
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differences in work performed. A nonunitary MRTS will produce an 
equilibrium wage ratio different from unity, under most economic condi-
tions. 
Welch's Specification and Estimates 
Welch (1980) estimated an equation of the form: 
(1) lnW .. = a
0 
+ 
1] 
+ ••• + 
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aluij + a2Uij + S2T2 
86T6 + y2C2Uij + ••• 
where lnW .. is the natural log of the ratio of union to nonunion 
1] wages; 
U is the ratio of unionized to total union and nonunion 
craftsmen employed; 
T is a dummy variable for the trade; 
and C is a dummy variable for the city. 
He used only 90 of the observations available from the 1973 BLS survey. 
These obse'rvations included six crafts in fifteen cities. His study ex-
eludes four crafts for which data were reported. Table 1 below repro-
duces his equation as estimated. 
His results with their highly significant coefficients on unioniza-
tion, clearly show the proportion of workers organized to be directly re-
lated to the log of the union nonunion wage ratio. Taking the partial 
of his dependent variable with respect to unionization, setting it equal 
to zero, and solving for U shows that the maximum wage ratio is achieved 
when 65.68% of the craft is organized. 
Welch's study suffers from two flaws, data inadequacy and model mis-
specification. The data inadequacy occurs because the BLS survey deals 
with wages of employed workers and not compensation. As Welch points out 
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(page 156), prior research has shown that construction fringe benefits 
rise with negotiated wages (Gustman and Segal, 1972) and that nonunion 
wage supplements are smaller than union supplements (Northrup and Foster, 
1975). Given this problem (which cannot be corrected with the available 
data) the peak union-nonunion wage ratio point cannot accurately be 
calculated. In addition, the BLS data report only employed craftsmen. 
Ideally, the unionization ratio would be calculated as total construe-
tion union members divided by total construction craftsmen. The use of 
"employed" rather than "total" carries with it the implication that 
equal proportions of union and nonunion craftsmen are unemployed. No 
tests of this implication are available. 
The misspecification problem is serious. Several factors which 
might affect the wage ratio are not included in his model. These in-
elude institutional, demand, and supply factors which might have impacts 
on the wage ratio but which may be correlated with the level of unioniza-
tion. Failure to include them runs the risk of attributing their impact 
to the unionization variable or other of his variables, which might be 
correlated with them. 
Replication and Extension . 
We have extended Welch's estimating equation to take the form: 
(2) 1 W U + c
2
u2.. V n . . = c 0 + c 1 . . + c 3 J. 1J . 1J IJ 
+ c4R. + c5
M .. + c6B .. + c 7c + ••• + c C + s .. J 1J 1J n 1J 
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lnW--natural log of union nonunion craft wages 
u--percent unionized 
V--percent change in the volume of construction ac-
tivity since the previous year 
R--general unemployment rate 
M--average manufacturing wages divided by craft wages 
B--dummy variable for coordinated bargaining participa-
tion 
c--craft union dummy variables. 
Our model modifies Welch's by explicitly including demand, supply, 
and institutional forces which are hypothesized to a ffect the union-
nonunion wage ratio. Welch's model used city dummy variables as a corn-
posite proxy for all of these three effects. This masks the effect of 
market conditions, which can be measured directly. 
Research has consistently found union membership and bargaining 
power to be consistently positively related to demand. Beginning with 
Friedman (1951), however, economists have recognized that rapid infla-
tion may be associated with a reduced union wage pr~rniurn due to the lack 
of flexibility imposed on the wage process by multiyear contracts. More 
recently Ashenfelter's (1978) empirical work has found evidence consist-
ent with this hypothesis while Hendrix (1981) concludes that the associ-
ation between cyclical inflation and industrial concentration variation 
makes the assignment of causation to contract duration more treacherous. 
In tHe present case the advent of w~ge and price controls reduced the 
duration of negotiated construction wage contracts to an average of only 
eighteen months. Such brief duration contracts could hardly lead to 
much less flexibility of union than nonunion wages. Strong demand 
should thus increase union more than nonunion wages through increased 
r 
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bargaining power. We measure changes in demand here by the percentage 
change in the total volume of construction starts (as measured by data 
collected by F. W. Dodge). This variable is omitted in the 1972 regres-
sion as 1971 F. W. Dodge data are unavailable. 
Supply is measured by the city's unemployment rate. This, of course, 
reflects the volume of labor available for construction. As such it bet-
ter reflects the quality of labor available to the nonunion sector where 
only skill barriers to entry exist. Thus as the unemployment rate in-
creases nonunion construction wages should be suppressed and the differ-
ential between union and nonunion wages wider. 
Bowlby (1980) found that construction workers earn a substantial 
portion of their annual incomes from nonconstruction activity. Indeed 
37 percent of construction workers' nonconstruction annual incomes is 
derived from work in the manufacturing sector alone. This sector is 
nearly twice as large a source of construction worker earnings than any 
other nonconstruction sector. When deciding whether to work in the manu-
facturing sector or construction sector the relative wages of the two 
sectors must be an important consideration. We include the ratio be-
tween a specific craft's negotiated wages and the manufacturing wage 
rate 'as an independent variable to capture this effect. Since most con-
struction workers who come out of manufacturing probably go to the non-
union construction sector, that sector and the nonunion sector are part 
of the same labor market. Thus nonunion construction wages must be set 
just high enough to make construction a better alternative for workers 
than manufacturing. 
This line of argument suggests that nonunion construction wages are 
established jointly with manufacturing wag7s. We thus expect this 
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variable to be inversely related to our formulation of the dependent 
variable, i.e., the better the unionized craft performs r eLative to the 
manufacturing sector the greater the disparity between union and non-
union construction wages. 
The dummy. variable for coordinated bargaining reflects this insti-
tutional arrangement. One presumes that both unions and contractors 
agree to this arrangement in the belief that it is in their self inter-
est to do so. We include the variable to control for this arrangement 
but adopt no specific hypothesis about its impact on our dependent vari-
able. 
Finally craft dummy variables are included in the equation. These 
~ 
variables capture craft specific institutional factors. Some crafts 
bargain more frequently, have wider labor markets, are leaders, etc.; 
these factors would have an independent impact on the dependent vari-
able. 
Proportion unionized and proportion unionized squared are speci-
' 
fied as in Welch (1980). Should a significant positive coefficient be 
estimated for the unionization variable support will exist for the 
microeconomic, competing factor argument. Should the coefficient on 
the unionization variable be insignificant, the balkanization hypothe-
sis will be supported. 
The most consistent set of crafts and cities were sampled in 1973 
and 1977. The 1977 equation includes percent change in unionization 
since 1973 as an additional independent variable. 
Time Periods and Sample 
We estimated the equation for each of the four time periods, 1972, 
1973, 1976, and 1977, which the B.L.S. has surveyed to date and include 
8 
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every craft surveyed. The set of cities differ across years and crafts 
differ across years and within time periods. Our four equations will 
therefore vary in tpe number of observations across periods and the num-
ber of craft dummy variables included. In each case, carpenters are 
omitted from the list of craft dummies (to avoid a singular data matrix). 
The assortment of years in which surveys were made gives us an 
opportunity to analyze the effects of wage controls on the wage , ratio; 
1972 and 1973 were control years while 1976 and 1977 were not. We hy-
pothesize that a smaller amount of the variations in the dependent vari-
able will be accounted for during the controls years. This is consist-
ent with the announced control period intention to reestablish tradi-
tional relationships. 
The Estimates 
Table 2 lists the estimates for Equation (2). The estimates 
clearly support the balkanization thesis. In no case is there a signifi-
cant coefficient on the unionization squared variable or the percent 
change of unionized variable. The only significant coefficient on the 
unionization variable is in the 1977 regression and that coefficient is 
of the wrong sign. Simply .stated, the evidence presented here is incon-
sistent with the thesis that the level, OJ: changes in the level, of 
unionization have an impact on the ratio of union to nonunion wages in 
construction. 
More complete specification of the model illustrates that Welch's 
finding of a significant relationship was an artifact of underspecifica-
tion. This finding was foreshadowed by Welch's experimentation with 
his own model. The first model he reported (which included only U and 
u2 had coefficients on U and u2 which were significant at the .01 level. 
r 
I 
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When he added city and craft dummy variables the significance level on 
the union variable coefficients dropped to the .05 level. 
It is unlikely that the lack of significance of unionization is due 
to a limited range problem. The mean percentage unionized in 1977 for 
the sample was 68.4%, with observations ranging from 4.7% to 99.6%. 
Similarly, the mean percent change in unionization from 1973 until 1977 
was -5.2% with a range of from 92.9% decrease to a 116.4% increase. 
Unionization on average in 1973 was 63.2%. 
The extremely high correlations between percent unionized and its 
square suggested the possibility of upward biased standard errors and, 
thus, of significant effects being found insignificant.. To test the 
possibility that the dependent variable was, indeed, sensitive to per-
centage unionized, we applied the RESET test for specification error 
discussed by Ramsey (1974, pp. 34). 
Equation (2) was estimated without percent unionized and its square. 
The residuals of that estimation£ .. ' were recorded and regressed on the 
l.J 
two omitted variables: 
If the removal of U .. and U .. 2 from equation (2) introduces significant 
l.J l.J 
misspecification, then the F-test for the entire relationship expressed 
in Equation (3) will lead to the rejection of the null hypothesis ·, "no 
significant relationship." 
The results of the RESET tests for 1972, 73, 76, and 77 were fully 
consistent with the results shown in Table 2 (a tabular summary of those 
tests is available from the authors 9n request). That is, for 1972, 
1973, and 1976, the omission of percent unionized and percent unionized 
•' 
• 
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square would generate no significant underspecification of the model. 
For 1977, the only year for which percent unionized had a significant 
coefficient in Table 2, one must reject the hypothesis of "no relation-
ship" for Equation (3). 
The large statistically significant negative coefficient on unioni-
zation in 1977 is hard to explain. Taken literally it implies that the 
union-nonunion wage ratio was 50.1% smaller when 100% of the workforce 
was organized. Given the significance of only 10%, the small sample, 
and the lack of theory to support the sign, one is tempted to treat the 
coefficient as a statistical aberation. It does, however, fit into a 
pattern. For the years 1972, 1973, 1976 and 1977 the coefficients on 
percent unionized are .544, .339, .210, and -.5()1, respectively. Ad-
mittedly, the first three coefficients are not significant at tradi-
tional levels. The pattern of continual decrease might suggest that the 
best organized locals either moderated wage demands for competitive rea-
sons or that nonunion contractors in their labor markets were willing to 
pay nearly union wages to get workers to work nonunion. We see this 
pattern as very weak evidence of a movement back toward an equilibrium. 
In 1973 and again in 1976 the coefficient of the manufacturing wage 
ratio took on a statistically significant negative sign. In the other 
two years the coefficients were statistically insignificant. This find-
ing is consistent with the argument that nonunion construction wages and 
manufacturing wages are set in the same labor market. 
In all three years for which change in construction volume data was 
available a _positive coefficient was estimated. In 1973 and 1977 the 
coefficient was statistically significant. Construction unions are 
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apparently able to convert increased demand into a wider wage margin 
over nonunion workers. 
The labor supply variable, unemployment, had the expected signifi-
cant positive sign only in 1977. An insignificant coefficient was es-
timated for the other two periods. General labor supply looseness thus 
contributes to the union sector's differential, but the one out of four 
time periods for which this happens makes the empirical association quite 
tenuous. 
In no case did coordinated bargaining have a significant impact on 
the wage ratio. Perhaps there is no practical significance to formal 
coordination. The communications network of craft unions may well ac-
complish the same end as does formal coordination. 
The craft pattern is quite mixed. The bricklayer coefficient is 
significant three times, positive in 197Z and negative in 1973 and 1977. 
This may only reflect a repetitive two-year bargaining pattern. 
During the wage control years 1972 and 1973, 18% and 31% of the 
variation in the dependent variables were accou~ted for. In the post-
controls years, 1976 and 1977, 76% and 42% of the variation was ex-
plained. The controls were intended to replace market and institutional 
forces with "order." They apparently succeeded. No other major pattern 
of variation is apparent in the independent variables' coefficients 
across the controls-market era. 
Discussion 
The very limited set of data available support the balkanization 
notion. Craft unions do not appear to respond to loss o~ market by re-
ducing their wage premium over unorganized workers. This finding is 
bolstered by the apparent interaction of manufacturing and nonunion 
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- craft wages. Craft unions can apparently toler;ate even high general un-
employment without lowering their wage demands. 
'Even ,though our results are consistent across time; we choose not 
to gen-eralize to other time periods or to all crafts within the same pe-
tiods. The largest set of observations represented in any of our esti-
mates is 98. This is a small fraction of the universe of craft-city ob-
servations and was not randomly selected by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. 
i' .. ~ 
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TABLE 1 
Regression Results: Union-Nonunion Wage Ratio on Extent of 
Trade Union Organization and Selected Dummy 
Variables (N = 90) 
Variables Estimated Coefficients t-Statistics 
Constant 0.00962 0.069 
u2 1.15420 2.293** 
u -0.87755 -2.107** 
T2 0.06647 1.141 
T3 0.06550 1.131 
T4 0.00495 0.084 
T5 {sheet metal) 0.12463 2.185** 
T6 (laborers) 0.11329 2.031** 
C2U 0.02266 o. 273 
C3U 0.06495 0.760 
C4U 0.01161 0.122 
C5U 0.04150 0.506 
C6U 0.13785 0.818 
C7U 0.04104 .. " 0.344 
C8U 0.03116 0.256 
C9U (Miami) -0.15626 -1.935* 
ClOU -0.06185 -0.383 
CllU -0.05317 -0.501 
C12U 0.05892 0.612 
Cl3U -0.12718 -1.246 
Cl4U (Denver) -0.15700 -1. 957* 
C15U -0.10796 -1.066 
R2 = 0.3653 
S.E.E. = 0.15244 
F = 1.92** 
*Significant at the .10 level 
**Significant at the .05 level 
r 
I 
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TABLE 2 
Dependent Variable: Natural Log of Union/Nonunion Craft \ITage 
Variable 
Coordinated Bargaining 
% Unionized 
(% Unionized) 2 
1973-1977 % Change 
in Unionized 
Manufacturing Wage Ratio 
Percent Change in Volume 
of Construction 
Unemployment 
Bricklayers 
Cement Masons 
Electricians 
Iron Workers 
Laborers 
Painters 
Pipefitters 
Plumbers 
Roofers 
Sheet Metal Workers 
Constant 
R2 
F 
N 
1972 
-.070 
(1.47) 
.544 
(.73) 
-.654 
(1.10) 
.209 
(.59) 
.015 
(.94) 
-.301 
(2.042)*** 
-.35 
( .46) 
.35 
(.50) 
-.076 
(.80) 
.052 
(.57) 
-.050 
(. 64) 
.054 
(.36) 
.043 
( .47) 
• 216 
.18 
1.83* 
48 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*Significant at .10 level. 
**Significant at .05 level. 
***Significant at .01 level. 
1973 
-.045 
( .04) 
.339 
(.65) 
-.357 
( .84) 
-.568 
(2.20)** 
.232 
(2.53)** 
-.005 
(. 36) 
-.242 
Year 
(3.24)*** 
.078 
(1. 23) . 
.073 
(1. 27) 
.228 
(3.16) *** 
.064 
(. 6 7) 
.032 
(.54) 
.038 
(. 64) 
.167 
(2.88)*** 
.642 
.31 
3.84*** 
98 
1976 
.036 
(.54) 
.210 
(.55) 
-.389 
(1.12) 
-1.055 
(5.03)*** 
.072 
(1.23) 
-.016 
(1.10) 
~ 
-.024 
(. 23) 
.136 
(1.56) 
.172 
(2.-25)** 
.254 
(2. 14)** 
.396 
(6.18)*** 
.198 
(2.87)** 
-.062 
(. 77) 
-.029 
(. 41) 
-.001 
( .00) 
.066 
( .07) 
• 909 
.76 
6.96*** 
30 
1977 
-.027 
(.58) 
-.501 
(1.67)* 
.092 
(. 39) 
.051 
(. 82) 
-.021 
(.089) 
.133 
(1. 78)* 
.037 
(2.014)** 
-.1'5 7 
(2.02)** 
.018 
(2.58)** 
.105 
(1.91)* 
.007 
(1.91)* 
.016 
(.10) 
.065 
(. 29) 
-.012 
(1.11) 
.119 
(2.15)** 
.295 
.42 
3.68*** 
64 
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